Overview
About vulnerability
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen()
syzbot reported the splat below without a repro.
In the splat, a single thread calling bt_accept_dequeue() freed sk and touched it after that.
The root cause would be the racy l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() call added by the cited commit.
bt_accept_dequeue() is called under lock_sock() except for l2cap_sock_release().
Two threads could see the same socket during the list iteration in bt_accept_dequeue():
CPU1 CPU2 (close())
sock_hold(sk) sock_hold(sk); lock_sock(sk) <– block close() sock_put(sk) bt_accept_unlink(sk) sock_put(sk) <– refcnt by bt_accept_enqueue() release_sock(sk) lock_sock(sk) sock_put(sk) bt_accept_unlink(sk) sock_put(sk) <– last refcnt bt_accept_unlink(sk) <– UAF
Depending on the timing, the other thread could show up in the “Freed by task” part.
Let’s call l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() under lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_release().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:86 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x26f/0x2b0 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88803b7eb1c4 by task syz.5.3276/16995
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 16995 Comm: syz.5.3276 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
Allocated by task 5326: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4365 [inline] __kmalloc_nopro —truncated—
Details
- Affected product:
- CentOS 7 ELS , Oracle Linux 7 ELS , RHEL 7 ELS , Ubuntu 16.04 ELS , Ubuntu 18.04 ELS , Ubuntu 20.04 ELS
- Affected packages:
- linux @ 5.4.0 (+6 more)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen()
syzbot reported the splat below without a repro.
In the splat, a single thread calling bt_accept_dequeue() freed sk and touched it after that.
The root cause would be the racy l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() call added by the cited commit.
bt_accept_dequeue() is called under lock_sock() except for l2cap_sock_release().
Two threads could see the same socket during the list iteration in bt_accept_dequeue():
CPU1 CPU2 (close())
sock_hold(sk) sock_hold(sk); lock_sock(sk) <– block close() sock_put(sk) bt_accept_unlink(sk) sock_put(sk) <– refcnt by bt_accept_enqueue() release_sock(sk) lock_sock(sk) sock_put(sk) bt_accept_unlink(sk) sock_put(sk) <– last refcnt bt_accept_unlink(sk) <– UAF
Depending on the timing, the other thread could show up in the “Freed by task” part.
Let’s call l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() under lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_release().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:86 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x26f/0x2b0 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88803b7eb1c4 by task syz.5.3276/16995
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 16995 Comm: syz.5.3276 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
Allocated by task 5326: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4365 [inline] __kmalloc_nopro —truncated—