CVE-2026-104872

Updated on 02 Oct 2026

Severity

5.8 Medium severity

Details

CVSS score
5.8
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Overview

About vulnerability

Impact

Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages recorded the database connection username as the db.user span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by enhancedDatabaseReporting or any other opt-in flag, and it was the default behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23.

The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal:

  • Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology.
  • Role-encoded usernames (e.g. admin_readwrite, app_readonly_prod) useful for privilege inference.
  • Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration.

Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below):

Package Vulnerable range Patched version
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver < 0.66.0 0.66.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex < 0.65.0 0.65.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose < 0.67.0 0.67.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql < 0.67.0 0.67.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2 < 0.67.0 0.67.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb < 0.46.0 0.46.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg < 0.73.0 0.73.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious < 0.40.0 0.40.0

Patches

Fixed in the coordinated release on 2026-07-23 via [feat!: only emit stable http, network and database attributes (#3585)](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/pull/3585).

Upgrade to the patched version listed in the table above for each instrumentation package in use.

Workarounds

No configuration-level workaround exists in the affected versions: the db.user attribute cannot be suppressed without patching. As a partial mitigation, a custom SpanProcessor can be used to strip db.user from spans before they leave the process:

// Example: drop db.user in a custom SpanProcessor
class StripDbUserProcessor implements SpanProcessor {
onStart(span: Span) {
span.setAttribute('db.user', null);
}
onEnd() {}
shutdown() { return Promise.resolve(); }
forceFlush() { return Promise.resolve(); }
}

Users who control the downstream collector can also filter the attribute at the collector pipeline level.

Details