Overview
About vulnerability
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size
f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack variable:
u32 data = 0; memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length);
req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path, which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write.
Validate req->actual against the expected payload size for the supported control selectors and decode only the expected amount of data.
This avoids copying a host-influenced length into a fixed-size stack object.
Details
- Affected product:
- AlmaLinux 9.2 ESU , CentOS 6 ELS , CentOS 7 ELS , CentOS 8.4 ELS , CentOS 8.5 ELS , CentOS Stream 8 ELS , CloudLinux 7 ELS , Oracle Linux 6 ELS , Oracle Linux 7 ELS , RHEL 7 ELS , TuxCare 9.6 ESU , Ubuntu 16.04 ELS , Ubuntu 18.04 ELS , Ubuntu 20.04 ELS
- Affected packages:
- kernel @ 4.18.0 (+15 more)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size
f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack variable:
u32 data = 0; memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length);
req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path, which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write.
Validate req->actual against the expected payload size for the supported control selectors and decode only the expected amount of data.
This avoids copying a host-influenced length into a fixed-size stack object.