Overview
About vulnerability
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the queued command buffer. Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request. A flaw was found in the Bluetooth subsystem of the Linux kernel. A remote attacker could exploit this by sending a specially crafted Bluetooth Mesh advertising payload. The system fails to properly validate the length of the advertising data against the provided payload, leading to an out-of-bounds write. This memory corruption could result in a denial of service.Details
KernelCare state
Live-patch status from KernelCare for each operating system.
| Operating system | Status | Covered kernels |
|---|---|---|
| Debian 12 | Released |
35 kernels
|
| Debian 13 | Planned | — |
| Ubuntu 24.04 | Planned | — |