Overview
About vulnerability
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()
Sashiko AI-review observed:
In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).
IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18.
If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).
This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.
Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info?
Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?
This patch implements the first suggestion.
I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.
Details
- Affected product:
- CentOS 8.4 ELS , CentOS 8.5 ELS , CentOS Stream 8 ELS
- Affected packages:
- kernel @ 4.18.0 (+2 more)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()
Sashiko AI-review observed:
In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).
IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18.
If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).
This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.
Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info?
Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?
This patch implements the first suggestion.
I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.