Overview
About vulnerability
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length
slhc_uncompress() parses a VJ-compressed TCP header by advancing a pointer through the packet via decode() and pull16(). Neither helper bounds-checks against isize, and decode() masks its return with & 0xffff so it can never return the -1 that callers test for – those error paths are dead code.
A short compressed frame whose change byte requests optional fields lets decode() read past the end of the packet. The over-read bytes are folded into the cached cstate and reflected into subsequent reconstructed packets.
Make decode() and pull16() take the packet end pointer and return -1 when exhausted. Add a bounds check before the TCP-checksum read. The existing == -1 tests now do what they were always meant to.
Details
- Affected product:
- Ubuntu 20.04 ELS
- Affected packages:
- linux-meta @ 5.4.0
Fixes
KernelCare state
Live-patch status from KernelCare for each operating system.
| Operating system | Status | Covered kernels |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon Linux 2023 | Planned | — |
| Debian 11 | Released |
37 kernels
|
| Debian 11 cloud | Released |
17 kernels
|
| Debian 12 | Planned | — |
| Debian 13 | Released |
10 kernels
|
| Ubuntu 22.04 | Planned | — |
| Ubuntu 24.04 | Planned | — |