CVE-2026-46123

About vulnerability

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put

virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the buffer we posted to the device. The RX skb is allocated in virtbt_add_inbuf() and exposed to virtio as exactly 1000 bytes via sg_init_one().

Checking len against skb_tailroom(skb) is not sufficient because alloc_skb() can leave more tailroom than the 1000 bytes actually handed to the device. A malicious or buggy backend can therefore report used.len between 1001 and skb_tailroom(skb), causing skb_put() to include uninitialized kernel heap bytes that were never written by the device.

The same path also accepts len == 0, in which case skb_put(skb, 0) leaves the skb empty but virtbt_rx_handle() still reads the pkt_type byte from skb->data, consuming uninitialized memory.

Define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE once and reuse it in alloc_skb() and sg_init_one(), and gate virtbt_rx_work() on that same constant so the bound checked matches the buffer actually exposed to the device. Reject used.len == 0 in the same gate so an empty completion can no longer reach virtbt_rx_handle().

Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because the length value comes from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log.

Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 (“net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer”), which hardened the USB 9p transport against unchecked device-reported length.

Affected product:

Ubuntu 20.04 ELS

Affected packages:

linux-meta @ 5.4.0

Live-patch status from KernelCare for each operating system.