CVE-2026-74556

About vulnerability

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer

iscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types into the fixed-size conn->data buffer, which is allocated for ISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes. For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP, REJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer.

The SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its data segment (sense/response data) into conn->data via iscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check. The only upstream bound on in.datalen is conn->max_recv_dlength, the initiator’s advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly negotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144). A target that returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and max_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn->data buffer.

Once the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly like those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn->data when present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data. Fold the opcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check.

Affected product:

CentOS 8.4 ELS , CentOS 8.5 ELS , CentOS Stream 8 ELS , Debian 10 ELS , Debian 11 ELS , TuxCare 9.6 ESU , Ubuntu 16.04 ELS , Ubuntu 18.04 ELS , Ubuntu 20.04 ELS

Affected packages:

linux @ 5.4.0 (+8 more)

Live-patch status from KernelCare for each operating system.